Recently I mentioned that I had just finished Heinz Guderian's book "Achtung, Panzer!". Well the next book on my reading list happened to be "The Rommel Papers", a book about Erwin Rommel's actions during the second world war, made up of a combination of Rommel's own narrative and notes that he recorded, letters he wrote home to his wife, and commentary from Basil Liddell-Hart who edited the book (as well as contributions from Rommel's son Manfred and one of his general's, whose name escapes me right now). In that spirit today I'd like to look at an interesting and much debated concept with relation to military matters; mission command.
More commonly you'll hear people refer to it by the German name "Auftragstatik" (roughly "Mission type tactics"). It's been the subject of a hell of a lot of books, articles and debate, and at times almost seems wrapped in mystery, not least because the British army (so the story goes) attempted to introduce this process in the late 1980's, yet is still struggling to implement it in practice.
Well often I tend to find that if you want to understand something like this properly then really you need to go back to the source, the origin of the theory. Supposedly the German army during world war 2 was the embodiment of the mission command approach, so having got most of the way through 'The Rommel Papers' it's been interesting comparing Rommel's comments and observations about the war with the generally accepted theories.
His previous book about his time during the first world war, 'Infantry Attacks', is also an interesting read in this regard as he often found himself as a subordinate leader at the sharp end of the action having to take on a command role above his rank. When compared to his role as a division commander during the invasion of France and as an army commander in North Africa, Rommel was one of the few to have plenty of active combat experience at both ends of the command chain.
Now the two words that seem to be most associated with the mission command approach are 'decentralisation' and 'intent'. In other words the underpinning ideal of mission command is to decentralise command to the lowest level possible, where junior commanders then use their superiors overall intent to guide their decision making. This is seen as the ideal and is the opposite of rigid command systems where junior officers must adhere strictly to their formal orders, orders which can run into several pages depending on the nature of operations.
In theory it sounds great. The problem of course is that military operations, especially more modern combined arms operations, require a certain degree of coordination. Artillery, air support, logistics, armour, infantry, engineers etcetera all need to work together to achieve the desired objectives. If commanders at a junior level were given absolute freedom of operation then this level of coordination would clearly not be possible. In practice then there has to be certain finite limits on the amount of autonomy in decision making that can actually be granted.
It's at this point that the waters begin to become muddy. Rommel for example enjoyed considerable freedom of operation as a young officer in the first war, particularly on the eastern front in Romania and later in Italy. His commanding officer was routinely inclined to push units forward and leave Rommel to command, organise and deploy them as he saw fit. You'd think then that on this basis Rommel would go on to become the very model of a modern Major-General. Yet as commander of the 7th Panzer Division in 1940 he appears to have become the very model of the modern meddling general.
Far from sitting back and allowing his subordinates to get on with the job as per the underlying principle of mission type command, Rommel instead preferred to be at or near the front, directing his battalion commanders in person. On many occasions he openly admits to taking personal control of company level formations and directing them to where he specifically desired.
In North Africa he was frequently absent from his command post during the action, preferring to take to the skies or the road to track his various formations and hurry them along. In at least once instance this, as it happens, prompted one of his staff officers to make an important operational level decision in his absence. When he returned to his HQ and found out about this decision he was livid, only later (grudgingly) accepting that this was the correct move.
There is little doubt, even among his detractors, that Rommel was a superb leader and tactician. The results he achieved on the battlefield despite trying circumstances would bear this out. But he was very much a fiddler, a micro manager who revelled in the minutiae of his profession. In Romania he was at times placed in command of multiple companies, effectively becoming the de facto equivalent of a modern battalion commander (despite being ranked as a mere senior lieutenant), yet persisted in personally emplacing machine guns ahead of attacks, and then guiding said attacks from the front.
While often complimentary of many his subordinates, both in the first and second wars, Rommel also routinely bemoaned that lack of opportunities to exercise with his forces and how this affected the subsequent smoothness of operations, to the extent that as mentioned previously he would often get involved in matters that were significantly below his command level.
And herein lies one of the core problems with mission command/type tactics; the quality of the subordinate officers and their understanding of their commanders mindset is critical to making the whole thing work.
The theory behind the approach is that subordinate commanders should be free to make their own choices within a certain framework. In reality for mission command to work properly then the subordinate commander has to effectively make the same decision that their superior would have made if he was in that position. A junior officer might make a move that seems perfectly rationale and reasonable when explained in a certain manner, but unless this move meshes with the thinking of his senior then often such moves can crumble an entire over arching plan.
The subordinates also need to be good officers in general. Poor quality officers, left to their own devices, are apt to make appalling decisions. The success of someone like Rommel in the first world war was not so much down to the command system in place as it was his personal traits as an officer. A different officer, one less capable, would likely have crumbled under the same circumstances. At the very least a less active, daring and offensive minded officer would not have pulled off many of the same superb coups that Rommel achieved.
And his point regarding exercises seems to be the absolutely most critical aspect of implementing a system of devolved command such as this.
If you're expecting someone at a lower level of responsibility to take action independent of orders, or to take a brief order and convert this into a fully formed plan of action, then they need to have a clear idea of what is expected of them. They need to be clear for example about whether aggressive action is favoured. or whether cautious action is favoured. The only way to develop this kind of understanding is through repeated and thorough instruction.
An example of the mission command/tactics approach that always seems to surface is that of Admiral Nelson at Trafalgar. We're constantly reminded of how Nelson planned to engage the enemy in a general battle, one which would favour the side whose Captain's could act with the most initiative. But really the Royal Navy Captains weren't acting quite as independently as some people like to think (or represent).
Yes, they had the freedom to engage whichever enemy ships were deemed most convenient to them at the time. But fundamentally they were acting on orders and a plan that had been generated well in advance. Nelson - as we understand it - had taken the opportunity presented to him by prior meetings and dinners with his Captains to explain in detail what he expected. Effectively a nautical exercise without troops (or ships). The British Captains were not so much seizing the initiative as executing a pre-defined strategy.
Far from being the action in the moment that's key to effectively operating a mission command approach, it's the exercises and the discussions that take place before any contact with the enemy is made that are so important to making it all work.
A second key feature would also appear to be the manner in which mistakes are treated. As mentioned previously while Rommel was upset to find that his operations officer had made a major decision without his permission (one which prompted a general withdrawal) the extent of his displeasure went no further than to have a bit of a huff and then a lie down. Once he'd had the opportunity to calm down and assess the decision in a less emotional and more objective light he ultimately seemed to agree that it was the right choice, albeit a frustrating one for him.
On the other hand if the punishment for decisions that displease a senior commander are harsh then this will only serve to stifle creativity and initiative. This was (thankfully) one of the lingering problems - among many - that affected the Iraqi forces during the 1991 and 2003 campaigns. The consequences for taking action without prior authorisation, especially if it ended poorly, were grim. Thus the desire among subordinates to act independently was suppressed.
To reference back to the Royal Navy of old for a moment, the execution of Admiral John Byng in 1757 is often seen as a watershed moment in the services history, one that spurred the remaining captains, commodores and admirals into action, almost literally in some cases. But it should be noted that one of the things that had caused Byng to approach the battle of Minorca so tentatively in the first place was the fate of Admiral Thomas Mathews a decade before him.
Mathews had left his line at the battle of Toulon and tried to engage the rear of an enemy fleet that was slipping away. He was subsequently criticised and ultimately cashiered from the service, partly for; "having brought the fleet into action in a disorganised manner". At Minorca, Byng refused to take a similar action when the opportunity presented itself, mainly because he believed the admiralty would disapprove and he would be cashiered himself. A somewhat ironic belief in the end.
The man who became an example of what would happen to officers who failed to take the initiative and to deviate from the fighting instructions when required had only become so because one of his predecessors had been punished for doing precisely that. It is also routinely glossed over that while the aggressive spirit that was fostered generated many victories, it also led to a number of defeats such as Grenada (1779) and Grand Port (1810).
So not only can the threat of serious punishment create a culture of inaction that hampers independent thinking and operation, it can in some cases do the reverse and create a culture of untempered aggression at all costs.
This then is what I feel are the two core elements of making any kind of devolved/mission command approach work properly; unified understanding through prior training and a sympathetic approach to mistakes. This to be underpinned by solid professional training.
Officers were (and to some extent still are) expected to meddle in details, even take temporary command of battalions or even companies - when they are with them.
ReplyDeleteA major general in command of a brigade may easily take over a tank company and lead a key flank attack if this is his main effort. He may also do so in a crisis.
But he's not supposed to give detailed orders about what other, distant, units shall do in the meantime.
Rommel was a case of 'great colonel, poor general'. He wasn't good at sensing the culminating point of attack of an offensive, but he was probably the best leader of his generation for vanguard detachments (Vorausabteilung). He would have been a great Hussar general under Frederick the Great.
BTW, Rommel is overrated by the British and Americans. He was the German equivalent of MacArthur in regard to PR, and in no way in the same league as von Manstein and some others as a general.
One anecdote from an old German journal article on Auftragstaktik:
A battalion commander had ordered a company leader to set up his unit at a certain location and establish readiness.
Some time thereafter, he became worried and decided to look after the unit, for he hadn't heard much of interest from it.
He arrived on the scene, the company CO reported, everything was fine and the company CO was appalled. He had expected to be left alone, and had supposed that his superior does not expect any troubles unless trouble was reported.
The battalion CO (author) admitted this experience as a failure of his in Auftragstaktik. He admitted his subordinate was right and he should not have worried, but should have trusted him.
@ SO, thanks for stopping by,
DeleteAn organisation can't function properly if the senior staff are off fighting local fires all the time. Company commanders exist for a reason; to command their companies. If a more senior presence is required - due to casualties (assuming the ExO as well) or incompetence - then the brigade and battalion staff is brimming over with potential candidates to go and deal with the situation. The brigade commander has his job, which is commanding the brigade as a whole. That's why he was put there in the first place.
I'd also disagree about Rommel. He earned his reputation for doing exceptional things with a paucity of resources and in very trying circumstances. The fact that he was able to do as much as he did is nothing short of miraculous. I would also argue that his record demonstrates that his natural instincts on the offensive were his greatest strength, though perhaps at times he didn't know when to quit.
Your choice of words shows your misunderstanding.
DeleteA CO is in the German system supposed to be where he matters most - which may include take over a tank company and lead up front.
His XO ("senior staff") is meanwhile supposed to keep the staff running.
And I'm really not a lone voice when I say Rommel is overrated by the British. The British army forces lionized him to excuse their blunders. There's a huge group of superior WW2 generals. Rommel is more in a league with v.Strachwitz or Balck than with v.Manstein, for example.
I think the misunderstanding is yours.
DeleteYou're assuming that the rote German method is the be all and end all of a command system that has existed in various shapes and forms prior to the German adoption, which is where it was really hammered out into a more widespread and usable doctrine that is the basis of what we see today, and which evolves with time.
The CO being where he matters most is in a position where he can command his whole assigned forces in the most effective manner, which in most cases is going to be back at his command post, or watching nearby from a command vehicle, not in the thick of it commanding a unit that already has a sufficiently senior and capable officer with more recent relevant command experience at that level, not to mention a subordinate who can do the same, plus a host of other available officers who could be asked to take over.
Diving in at the last minute and fiddling with a local situation well below your rank is the anti-thesis of devolved command.
As for Rommel, he made some mistakes for certain, but fundamentally he dragged a rag tag army across the desert which contained a lot of elements that were unreliable or outgunned, with a totally inadequate supply situation supporting him, and very nearly managed to turn it into a stunning victory. His command and strategy throughout this campaign, as well as his earlier endeavours as an infantry commander and as the 7th Panzer Division commander are worthy of the praise he receives.
You're thinking British while thinking about German doctrine.
Delete"The CO being where he matters most is in a position where he can command his whole assigned forces in the most effective manner,"
No, not in the German system. You forget Schwerpunkt is being applied on all levels by German doctrine and has been so for generations.
The CO has to be where he has the most influence - on the battle! This does not require him to be in control of "his whole forces at all". That is antithetic to Auftragstaktik.
The best place may be at his Schwerpunkt or at a location of crisis.
Besides, leadership is much more than command - a leader is supposed to gift a better morale to his troops through his presence. A soldier fighting in an attack within rifle shot distance to the division commander thinks that this attack is not meaningless!
And nobody insists on old plans when the general himself gives urgent orders during a crisis such as the Arras counter-attack (an HQ was certainly not the best place to counter that one!).
The mistake you're making is assuming that this doctrine is the sole preserve of German forces from WW2 and that there is no other choice or angle. Like I said, variants of this devolved system have been in operation for many years prior. The German army just became the most prominent and - for a time - the most successful proponents of it.
DeleteThe problem with your theory is that commander goes wandering off to what he presumes is the critical point and subsequently makes himself unavailable to deal with issues elsewhere because he's too busy playing company commander. While he's playing Major other people are requesting the diversion of divisional artillery support to dampen a counter attack. But the man who was promoted to command the division and make those sorts of decisions is nowhere to be found because he's too busy trying to tell a lieutenant how to command his platoon.
It's the complete opposite of a devolved command system. Imagine if Montgomery had parachuted in to Arnhem with the excuse "well, this is the Schwerpunkt for my army group!". It's ridiculous.
The CO doesn't need be found. The XO is his substitute when the CO isn't with the HQ.
DeleteOfficers cannot function 24/7 anyway. They collapse after 4 days without sleep discipline, which means you need a 'B' team anyway.
A brutal, European style war consumes battalions daily, including - and especially - their leadership. So a brigade CO and a battalion CO and a company CO all need be replaceable in an instant. This is a necessity, or the ground forces become either too brittle or too stubborn for want of leadership once the CO becomes ineffective for whatever reason.
You rate the CO too highly, as more unique than he must be.
And no, a Bn CO may take over a platoon under some circumstances, but he wouldn't tell the Platoon CO how to do his job unless we're talking about 90 day wonders. The Bn CO would lead the Platoon and the Lt would temporarily serve as a kind of NCO.
This isn't about micromanaging, it's about taking charge of forces at the decisive point.
Various forms of mission-based command / manoeuvre à posteriori have been used throughout time, but the problem here is that you don't understand the nature of Auftragstaktik in German forces or its internal logic. You got to understand it, or else you don't understand the core of the various mission-based order regimes or why and when they make sense. Most mission based command systems are mere husks which don't work properly and are frequently given up in favour of detailed orders.
That's the problem with many anglophone writings about mission-based orders; the authors know the surface and effect, but don't understand the internal workings, the "why".
And Montgomery in '45 was the equivalent of an army group (Heeresgruppe) commander; those visited divisions, but didn't take charge. The highest COs of the Heer who took charge at a Schwerpunkt were usually the corps COs (and Rommel, but his manoeuvre forces in Africa were essentially corps-sized even when designated as an army).
Auftragstaktik on the Army group level at times looked like this:
A planned operation commences, Army group CO goes to eat and sleep, expecting that few reports will be received during the first hours and then his staff will take hours to form a useful situation picture from incoming reports.
You persist in this assumption that the German method is the perfect way of doing it and that all other forms are inferior. Certainly they were some of the more famous historical practitioners, but ultimately the German approach is not the be all and end all of devolved command. It's not a pre-requisite for someone to be absolutely wed to the German model in order to use a devolved approach. There is a wider world that has advanced since then. Rather than applying the German method in a rote, word for word fashion, it's much more beneficial for people going forward to look at what the Germans did well and what they did poorly.
DeleteNow yes, you do have subordinates to take over for casualties and to pick up the slack generated by tiredness, pressure and information overload. But fundamentally a subordinate is learning the roles of their senior commander as they go along. They are still behind the curve a little. The CO was promoted to that position because he was deemed ready to take on that level of responsibility. And that is where he makes the greatest impact.
There are numerous officers on a battalions strength capable of commanding a company. There are plenty more who could command a company in an emergency. There are less officers who are adequately trained and/or prepared for battalion command. If a battalion commander is worried about the point of decision, then he applies his best units/commanders to it. If this is inadequate for whatever reason, he has a headquarters full of suitable candidates who have more recent command experience at that level than he does that can be sent to manage the situation. What he doesn't have is a plethora of officers entirely suited to taking over his position in his absence.
He was promoted to do a job. That job is battalion command. Going to the front and taking over a platoon is at the complete opposite end of the scale of the devolved approach. It is tinkering and micro management in its most extreme form. At that point the battalion CO may be enjoying himself thoroughly in reliving his youth, but he has completely lost sight of the bigger picture. Meanwhile the actual job he was promoted to take on has simply been handed off onto someone less experienced. It's an utterly ridiculous proposition.
As for Montgomery (I did point out before he was an army group commander, your qualifier was unnecessary) by your theory he should be at the decisive point. He should be stuck in there man handling people and organising things in minute detail. It's odd that you suddenly think once command has reached this level that your previous rules no longer apply and that now it is fine for the commander to sit back and let others get on with things at the sharp end.
The only reasoning that you seem to offer for these conflicting positions is "this is what the Germans did in WW2, therefore it must be right".
The problem here is that you accuse me of deifying the German WW2 mission command doctrine without understanding it yourself. How can you claim that there are advanced (i.e. "better") ways if you don't understand it? I'm sure you weren't aware of how little you understood its inner workings when this exchange began.
DeleteAnd no, micromanagement is telling subordinates more than one level below what to do in detail. What I wrote about was replacing them temporarily and leaving them alone almost all the other time.
Besides; the usual Bn CO is learning his job, and isn't fully qualified. You don't get promoted to Bn CO because you're qualified to lead a Bn; you get promoted to that job because you're qualified to go learn on the job in the Bn CO job.
It is central to mission command in all its functional varieties to not pretend that there are huge competence differences between junior and senior officers; one ought to pretend that those who were chosen and trained as officers at all are capable of much.
A Lt has to be able to understand a Bn's plan and mission.
The old German doctrine of requiring troops to be able to replace their direct superior (stems from about 1906) is only a slight extension and renders your competence concerns moot. Loss rates amongst junior officers up to Bn Cmd were such that there was hardly ever someone with on paper full training in command - and a Bn may in fact have been decimated to a large Coy anyway.
The command system coped with this rather well, because there was no illusion of a very much prepared and competent CO. Any command system set up to exploit a very much competent CO to the fullest will very often fail because such COs are not the norm during a land campaign (not even and particularly not during the first week!).
"As for Montgomery (...) by your theory he should be at the decisive point."
COs of this level cannot be less than hundreds of km away from at least some of their troops in contact. Back in WW2 even STOL liaison aircraft were an unsatisfactory means of transportation, so only commanders up to corps level regularly took charge at their decisive point. An army group CO would merely spend more attention on his, maybe inspect the formations planned for a pivotal role more thoroughly than others.
Keep in mind corps often marched along very few if not even only one road. Their vanguards were spaced by only a few kilometres. A corps CO was very much able to lead up front and move from one unit to another, while an army group commander had to deal with a frontage of hundreds of kilometres and his job was much more about logistics than on the corps level.
In short; a corps CO's job may be to make sure his lead elements cross a river in four days; an army group's CO job would then be to assign roads, air support and supplies to them, but the execution isn't his job. His "in person" intervention would not be about taking command of a lead element, but about talking to the air force XO or army quartermaster. This shift happened between corps and army COs.
You're touting the German approach as being the best solution. I'm saying a better solution is to allow the appropriate commander of the unit in question to do the job and have the senior commander stick to the broader picture, thus accepting the German approach (I did mention the micro-managing in the post) and suggesting a better solution.
Delete"I'm sure you weren't aware of how little you understood its inner workings when this exchange began"
-- I understand the workings well. You seem to be the one that's a little confused.
As for the micro management, replacing someone several ranks below you is a perfect example of this. The fact that you're doing their job for them while they watch is probably worse than just giving them detailed instructions
"You don't get promoted to Bn CO because you're qualified to lead a Bn"
-- I'm not sure as you'll find a single army on the planet (aside from those where favour determines promotion) that promotes people to the battalion level who aren't ready. Typically such candidates will have worked in a battalion staff role for several years prior to prepare them for that job. And assuming that your theory is correct then it simply reinforces how important that commander is. If he's only just "qualified to learn" then everyone under him is necessarily considered unsuitable under your system, including the executive officer.
"It is central to mission command... to not pretend that there are huge competence differences between junior and senior officers; one ought to pretend that those who were chosen and trained as officers at all are capable of much"
-- And yet you presume that a lieutenant requires a bn commander to come along and take over his role because you don't trust him to do his job properly. Nor the Captain and Major above him. Nor any of the other bn staff officers. You've just demonstrated how staggeringly hypocritical your position is. The rest of your paragraph - while reflective of the more common principles underlying a devolved command system - is the complete opposite of your prior stated position.
The point that I'm trying to get across to you is that there are more people qualified and experienced to command a level below them than there are people ready to command a level above. The pool inside of a bn of people qualified and experienced to take over a platoon leaders position is quite broad. The pool of people with the necessary experience to take over as a temporary bn commander is much shallower. Thus it makes no sense whatsoever to let a bn commander go forward and command a mere platoon, when there are double digit numbers of subordinates who are more than capable of doing this if needed, while the number of people who could adequately replace the bn commander in his absence is very small.
As for Montgomery etc, your previously stated view is that a commander should be present at the decisive point. You advocated a bn commander jumping down several levels below his normal standing to start wielding authority over a platoon. Yet now you back off from the idea of an army group commander descending on a Corps headquarters to run the battle at the decisive point?
The only logical explanation of why you seem to apply two completely different standards to two different people is "the Germans did it this way in WW2". Your argument about the role of the army group commander is irrelevant (not least because you've burst into the church to start lecturing the vicar about religion) because the bn commander would fill a similar role at his level but tailored to his context , i.e. the bn commander is responsible for assigning the tasks to his companies, their axis of operation, arranging the application of fire support and making sure his troops are supplied adequately, but leaves the "clear that wood" etc to the relevant coy commander.
"If he's only just "qualified to learn" then everyone under him is necessarily considered unsuitable under your system, including the executive officer."
DeleteThat's logically not necessary at all - it says nothing about the others. The Bn CO was selected for the position. That's the only necessarily unique thing about him.
"As for Montgomery etc, your previously stated view (...) Yet now you back off from the idea (...)"
That's nothing unusual. Many disciplines have such phenomenons; you get more power by revving up an engine, until at some point more rpm becomes unwise. It's about making compromises, and said compromises make more sense up to corps level than above. Personal intervention by COs was very successful on the tactical level.
The personal intervention works best when the distances aren't too large. Also, the nature of command changes from junior NCO to head of army with every step. Some tasks become less important (leadership), others become more important (administration, later politics). Corps command was the highest true manoeuvre command (now it's probably the brigade cmd), and thus the largest formation for COs to use personal intervention wisely.
You may have difficulty with grasping the concept of personal intervention because you use the "micromanagement" lens. You should pay more attention to the morale influence of a senior commander on the scene. This shows it:
"And yet you presume that a lieutenant requires a bn commander to come along and take over his role because you don't trust him to do his job properly."
No, it doesn't matter whether the Lt would have done the job properly. Doctrine laid the responsibility for getting the job done at the senior CO's feet at his Schwerpunkt. Being there means he's able to react to developing situations the quickest, and he can influence the situation by his presence in itself: The troops know by his presence that this battle truly counts and that they will get all necessary available support.
It makes usually no sense to let the CO be present, but not taking command.
"You're touting the German approach as being the best solution."
I consider it as the benchmark for mission command styles; we know its wartime performance under almost all kinds of conditions.
It's also visible how old armies which tried to add some more mission command to their command system adopted superficialities only.
Some newly established ground forces were much more able to use a mission command style - for a while.
"As for the micro management, replacing someone several ranks below you is a perfect example of this."
No, it's not. Personal intervention at the Schwerpunkt isn't even micromanagement at all.
Look up the definitions for it.
-- You were saying earlier that the Bn CO was only just beginning to learn his role. As a consequence anyone under him can have no more of an idea of his role than him, they being even further behind the learning curve as they lack his practical experience. This is logically undeniable. The Bn CO will also have been chosen because of his skill in command and his prior experience. He essentially represents one of the better officers from his class. He is unique in his battalion for this reason.
Delete"It's about making compromises, and said compromises make more sense up to corps level than above."
-- Which just so happens to reflect the German model of WW2. You're argument falls apart because there really is nothing to stop an army commander from "intervening" as you put it several layers below him, which is where the matter is likely to be decided. You're just making excuses to stick to the German model.
"You should pay more attention to the morale influence of a senior commander on the scene... "
-- Which historically has proven very limited, except in the cases of very senior, very well known commanders.
One would also presume that if part of the battalion is attacking while another part provides support then by definition the part that is attacking is going to get the most support. The troops are I suspect wise enough to figure this out for themselves without having to have a senior officer present to point out the obvious to them. People are a lot smarter in general than you're giving them credit for.
As for being able to react to the situation, the Bn CO could do so adequately from a short distance back, perhaps alongside the reserve company for the attack. He doesn't need to be commanding the lead platoon to monitor the situation. If he does go forward in that regard he also removes himself from being able to react to other situations elsewhere, because he's now consumed with the lead platoon.
I should also point out at this point something that should have struck me earlier, i.e. that there are no accounts that I've ever seen of a German battalion commander taking over the lead platoon. This thing you tout as the norm should have been happening on a routine basis at the lowest levels, yet there appears to be absolutely zero evidence to support your assertion.
"I consider it as the benchmark for mission command styles; we know its wartime performance under almost all kinds of conditions."
-- Yes, some good, some bad. It's also notable that mission command was hailed as the main reason for all the early German successes, yet later proved itself incapable of warding off defeat, when suddenly all the material and manpower factors that had been in Germany's favour early on and had been discounted as reasons for German victory were now suddenly the sole cause of its defeat.
"It's also visible how old armies which tried to add some more mission command to their command system adopted superficialities only."
-- And yet it worked superbly well for the Royal Navy for over 200 years. The success of Napoleon was a prime kickstarter for the Prussian development of what would become the later German system. Or in other words there is more to the world of devolved command than simply the German textbooks of the 1930's.
-- "Micromanagement; control [of] a person or a situation by paying extreme attention to small details. Often, this excessive obsession with the most minute of details causes a direct management failure in the ability to focus on the major details."
Or in other words, exactly what you're describing with your use of "intervention". There really is no way of getting around this SO. To any reasonable man on the street that is an utterly excessive abuse of managerial power. It's practically a textbook example of a micro manager.
My reply from yesterday didn't arrive?
DeleteThere's nothing in the spam folder. The last post of yours that I can see is dated June 7th and time stamped 01:57am.
Delete"You were saying earlier that the Bn CO was only just beginning to learn his role"
ReplyDeleteActually, I didn't.
"As a consequence anyone under him can have no more of an idea of his role than him"
No, why don't you get this simple question of logic? One man was selected as CO. This says NOTHING about the competence of his subordinates.
A hundred of them could be more competent, or they all could be morons. Him being selected only means he was selected - and absolutely nothing else. There's no other logical content to the fact that he was selected. It doesn't even mean the person(s) who promoted him into this function believed he was the best choice. Maybe they just didn't like some other candidate.
"[morale] historically has proven very limited, except in the cases of very senior, very well known commanders."
It shouldn't surprise that there's an abundance of germanophone literature to the contrary.
Even modern U.S.Army exercise reviews frequently complain about how COs stuck too much to their command posts.
"I should also point out at this point something that should have struck me earlier, i.e. that there are no accounts that I've ever seen of a German battalion commander taking over the lead platoon."
Maybe you didn't look out for it. I even remember an anecdote about Patton doing so.
"mission command was hailed as the main reason for all the early German successes, yet later proved itself incapable of warding off defeat"
To be fair, mission command broke down top first. Hitler began to micromanage in December 1941 and by late 1944 command (and enforcement of obedience) had become so rigid as to be unrelated to doctrine. Besides, nobody claims it to be an I-win button.
"all the material and manpower factors that had been in Germany's favour early on"
No such thing existed in May, 1940. Personnel quantity, material quantity and material quality were if anything favouring the Western allies.
recommended: http://tinyurl.com/pmebd8l
"And yet it worked superbly well for the Royal Navy for over 200 years."
Navies, especially pre-wireless navies, are a totally different thing. Especially as you were replying to a quote which explicitly was about "armies".
"Or in other words, exactly what you're describing with your use of "intervention"."
No, you're not paying attention to the definition. The Schwerpunkt is no detail, much less a "small detail". Everything else is detail once you've set one.
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Look, I tried to explain to you how the Schwerpunkt thing and the attention to the morale influence of the CO play into all this, how these things affect the command style and make command actions plausible and effective that you think are foolish.
You can't see these things being that important and I get that, so let's agree to disagree.
"Actually, I didn't."
Delete-- Erm, yes, you did; "Besides; the usual Bn CO is learning his job, and isn't fully qualified."
"Him being selected only means he was selected - and absolutely nothing else. There's no other logical content to the fact that he was selected"
You seem to be under the impression that armies select a Bn CO out of a hat, or by doing a random lottery. There will be a list of candidates. Each of these candidates will have previous experience, many of them on Bn staffs. They will have done courses in preparation. They will be marked against a variety of criteria related to their previous body of work and their competence to move up a level. They don't just wander into a room one day and a senior officer says 'you'll do, you're the new Bn CO'. There is an organised process designed to rigorously select the best candidates.
"It shouldn't surprise that there's an abundance of germanophone literature to the contrary"
-- Then perhaps you're comrades need that extra kick up the bum? British military history - even very recently - is replete with examples of where JNCOs took the initiative and conducted "inspiring" actions on their own. Basil Liddlel-Hart opens his book on Scipio by explaining how British troops were routinely frustrated by senior commanders who sought glory as platoon leaders. They actively considered it a negative, a glory/medal hunting activity that put the units wider mission in jeopardy.
"Maybe you didn't look out for it."
-- I've looked far and wide. If it was that common then at least one example should have stood out by now. Perhaps you can guide me?
"No such thing existed in May, 1940. Personnel quantity, material quantity and material quality were if anything favouring the Western allies."
-- Germany had a large number of troops, many of them very well trained, a superior medium machine gun, superior fighters and dive bombers, a superior anti-tank weapon, a large numbers of tanks (with radios) and industrial capacity to spare.
"Navies, especially pre-wireless navies, are a totally different thing."
-- Not really. They operate in a different way, but the principle of devolving command downwards to lower levels can be applied to anything from armies to supermarkets. It's a principle. This further reinforces my opinion that you're wed to the specifics of the German methods from WW2.
"No, you're not paying attention to the definition. The Schwerpunkt is no detail, much less a "small detail"."
-- Command of the lead platoon is a detail. It is a job that is well below the level of the Bn CO. The platoon commander does not need a Lt. Colonel to come and tell him how to do his job. And of course, what happens to the platoon next to him? Do they feel demotivated under your system because the CO chose someone else? Are they not relevant, despite being right there in the frontline? Your attempt to justify this obsessive level of interference is laughable.
"so let's agree to disagree"
-- Perhaps for the best.
P.S. Did you find out what happened with that other post? Or was it the one that came through 01.57 on the 7th?
I think that was a good debate.
"-- Germany had a large number of troops, many of them very well trained, a superior medium machine gun, superior fighters and dive bombers, a superior anti-tank weapon, a large numbers of tanks (with radios) and industrial capacity to spare."
DeleteYou should really read Frieser's book. It was in the British and French interest to claim German material or training superiority, but the reality was that the Western Allies were superior in many important areas, but they made less of it than the invader did with his inferior means.
Only 77 of 157 German divisions were fully operational in May 1940 and less than half of these had modern equipment and enough young combat troops with full training.
The Luftwaffe actually lost more aircraft than the Allies, and its superior influence derived from the operational plan, higher sortie rates and full commitment instead of large reserves.
"Command of the lead platoon is a detail."
And that's why you'll never think of Schwerpunkt the German way: To a German Bn CO, everything else is detail, but not the (small) unit that's at his Schwerpunkt, for the Schwerpunkt is what it's all about, everything else is supposed to do little more than to not fall apart.
"There is an organised process designed to rigorously select the best candidates."
You're naive here. Their job is to select the best, but they're fallible, and even if they did select the best one, it still wouldn't mean that there aren't dozens of similarly suited men in the Bn.
"I've looked far and wide. If it was that common then at least one example should have stood out by now. Perhaps you can guide me?"
You read about Rommel; pay attention to how often he led a battalion-sized vanguard force as Div or Corps commander. Nominally this would have been the job of the CO of the Kradschützenbataillon or Panzeraufklärungsabteilung. There are also stories of generals taking command of a single ATG company. At Arras, Rommel dictated the sites for individual artillery pieces as it had become his point of crisis, and thus the guns to form his temporary Schwerpunkt.
"Did you find out what happened with that other post?"
Not sure.
About navies; pre-wireless all you could do was to give a captain his orders and then let him do his thing until you see him again weeks or months later. This was a necessity imposed by long delay transmission of messages, and thus not comparable to land warfare.
"Only 77 of 157 German divisions were fully operational in May 1940 and less than half of these had modern equipment and enough young combat troops with full training."
Delete-- The British army was in a state, largely thanks to a 'peace in our time' mentality and many years of neglect as politicians rejected the notion that we would get caught in another land war on the continent. The French were convinced they could sit behind their barbed wire and bunkers right up until the last few months. Both armies were woefully ill prepared for a German invasion.
"The Luftwaffe actually lost more aircraft than the Allies, and its superior influence derived from the operational plan, higher sortie rates and full commitment instead of large reserves."
-- The Ju87 was quite vulnerable, but it was a weapon without peer on the opposite side. There was nothing that could bomb as accurately. The Bf 109 at this stage was also a superior fighter.
"And that's why you'll never think of Schwerpunkt the German way"
-- I understand what you're saying well enough and the concept in general. I'm just staying that I do not believe this is the best approach. I think it focuses far too tightly on the actions of 20-30 men at the expense of the others and wastes valuable resources.
"You're naive here. Their job is to select the best, but they're fallible, and even if they did select the best one, it still wouldn't mean that there aren't dozens of similarly suited men in the Bn."
-- It's possible that occasionally personalities play a role, which is why I believe the British system relies on multiple assessors and draws on a number of criteria to play down the influence of any one source. I think you're simply closing your eyes to the fact that there is quite a stringent process in place to weed out those who are unsuited for further progression and that a great deal of time and money is invested in preparing officers for such a demanding role. Time, investment and experience that is not widespread among the battalions other staff. There might be some, but not many. Certainly there are a hell of a lot more people capable of commanding a level below them than a level above.
I would suggest that this is actually quite glaringly obvious and you're just being stubborn because you've committed to a position which you refuse to give up in face of the evidence.
"You read about Rommel; pay attention to how often he led a battalion-sized vanguard force as Div or Corps commander."
-- By his own account he didn't lead them. He rode behind them. He gave instructions (take this road, press on to this objective etc) but he didn't grab the lead platoon and start playing Lieutenant. At Arras he happened to be Johnny on the spot, around the front lines when they came under fire and in the absence of time he took personal command of units near him. It was a desperate situation that was forced upon him. That I can understand, as there was no time for any other approach.
"About navies; pre-wireless all you could do was to give a captain his orders and then let him do his thing until you see him again weeks or months later. This was a necessity imposed by long delay transmission of messages, and thus not comparable to land warfare."
-- Admirals had (and at times did) have the option of imposing very strict instructions. I mentioned in the article the case of Admiral Byng, who being the man on the spot with the most information and the best assessment on conditions decided to go against his formal written orders. He was subsequently executed. Many Captains and Admirals over the period would face court martials for the mere offence of not attacking the enemy in a proper line of battle. To say that just because they lacked wireless communications there was no opportunity for overarching control and influence is to misunderstand the arrangements. It took time for the senior end of the Royal Navy to learn a bit of restraint.