tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post8331306441237767991..comments2024-01-12T18:59:05.080+00:00Comments on Defence With A "C": The Devil's Advocate: Special ForcesUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger26125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-56891045510165110882022-11-29T05:42:02.673+00:002022-11-29T05:42:02.673+00:00The collapsible kayak is perfect for casual calm w...<br />The <a href="https://www.terraventkayaks.com/products/portable-folding-kayak-terravent-k1-yellow" rel="nofollow">collapsible kayak</a> is perfect for casual calm water paddling. Our TERRAVENT K1 - Portable Folding Kayak, is the complete outdoor-adventure ready package.<br /><br /><br />Terravent Kayakshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06379548227942699350noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-48154445157038475222013-07-22T22:54:55.590+01:002013-07-22T22:54:55.590+01:00True. My thinking (and keeping in mind I was argui...True. My thinking (and keeping in mind I was arguing "for the other side" as it were) was that if you really wanted a large pool of physically fit individuals, as opposed to a pass/mass fail course, then you could structure it in such a way to build people up gradually. Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-15075030224914738432013-07-22T17:29:07.593+01:002013-07-22T17:29:07.593+01:00Yes I agree, generally.
But just stating there i...Yes I agree, generally. <br /><br />But just stating there is a far from perfect correlation between physical fitness and passing the arduous courses. You can't take it for granted that the racing snake who rocks up with his powders and gels and so forth is going to get very far. <br /><br />And preparation - yes if you've prepared well you'll stand a good chance especially since the preparation phase tends to self-select individuals in itself. But you have to have prepared yourself properly and you can't often do that on your own. It's one advantage the regulars have is that they get put through Pre-Para and Pre-Pre-Para courses which not only weeds out the unfit and the lame and lazy it prepares them for the brutal and arduous nature of the coming tests. And reserve soldiers don't get that. There's no 2.5 week Brigade centralised Pre-Para and then there's no 2 week Pre-Para up in Catterick. Same for the reserve SAS - reservists just don't get the collectivised and organised prep time the regulars get. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-5771054035359397522013-07-22T16:46:14.302+01:002013-07-22T16:46:14.302+01:00Afternoon,
I think it depends. The fitter and str...Afternoon,<br /><br />I think it depends. The fitter and stronger you are, the longer it takes to be pushed to your physical limits, which are tied closely with your mental limits. There is still a lot of "character" that will come into play, but fitter and stronger individuals should wear the demands a lot easier, especially if they've prepared specifically for this kind of thing.<br /><br />Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-43282474766073636542013-07-21T19:04:22.858+01:002013-07-21T19:04:22.858+01:00Fitness.
The thing is they are not looking so mu...Fitness. <br /><br />The thing is they are not looking so much for fitness as much as they are looking for a monster. I have personally seen many very fit people fail utterly at a particular "arduous" course. Why? Why do very fit people fail? They fail because their training programmes are excellent - first class and well engineered. And that is the problem. You take them away from that programme and you put them in a position where they are not in control any more, where they don't know how much pain is to come and for how long they will have to endure it, and they fold. The "arduous" courses take people, even very fit people, well outside their comfort zone. They might never have struggled in their old unit in PT but now on this course they are being smashed to fuck, day after day,2-4 times a day and nearly everyone will be carrying an injury. Whatsmore, if the DS see someone coasting they will either (a) bin them for not putting in the effort or (b) beast them harder until they are putting in the effort and they'll pile the mental and physical pressure onto these guys. <br /><br />These courses are in a way quite violent and aggressive - the elegant athlete may pass (there's always someone who glides through something) but more often than not it's the vomiting, grunting, gasping bag of snot with his helmet askew who refuses to stop shuffling onwards who will pass and it is them they want. <br /><br />You make most people fit enough for these courses in an abstract sense, but you can't give everyone the spine they really need to smash these courses and absorb the physical pain and the mental pressure. <br /><br />Phil from TD.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-32162742443134536902013-07-20T16:15:38.399+01:002013-07-20T16:15:38.399+01:00I'm sorry but that's bollocks.
10% of the...I'm sorry but that's bollocks.<br /><br />10% of the general population don't get fitter? Assuming we exclude the small number of people who have a variety of vary rare illnesses that significantly prohibit their ability to exercise in a meaningful way, there is absolutely bugger all evidence for that assumption (and no, that paper in no way constitutes evidence of your assertion).<br /><br />I've been interested in fitness and weight training for many years now. At a rate of 1 in 10 as you stated I should - by now - have stumbled across many people who express this phenomenon. Blimey, back at school 3 out of the roughly 30 people in our PE class should have shown this trait. I can't remember a single person who didn't develop over the time.<br /><br />This sounds like you just plucked it off the summary of a random study. Or Wikipedia.Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-64276013788577545512013-07-19T19:55:50.459+01:002013-07-19T19:55:50.459+01:00"Fitness is not a genetic predisposition. Giv..."Fitness is not a genetic predisposition. Given enough time and the correct regime, anybody who is physically able to walk and run can be trained up to a high level of fitness."<br /><br />Actually, there's quite a lot of genetics involved in fitness, genes probably account for around 50% of your response to exercise, although we're only just starting to figure out how it all works as there's a lot of genes involved. And there's various ways to define "fitness" - it's more complicated than just measuring vO2max. But at a broad sweep, 10% of the general population (not "the pongo population" note, self-selection may apply here) don't get fitter no matter how much training you give them, and there's another 10% or so who don't respond strongly. On the other hand, 10-20% respond very strongly, so it makes sense to identify them and train them appropriately.<br /><br />See eg http://jap.physiology.org/content/108/6/1487.long if you want some science....El Sidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-5255697467284069952013-07-18T20:41:39.634+01:002013-07-18T20:41:39.634+01:00That's entirely possible, especially when you ...That's entirely possible, especially when you consider the reported close ties between British and Australian SAS units. I suspect the whole thing is a combination of ideas and practices gleaned from seeing how others do it, like the US and their Rangers, or the significant size of the German GSG9 unit. Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-30002941110376898412013-07-18T07:49:54.377+01:002013-07-18T07:49:54.377+01:00The UK wasn’t the first to see the utility of this...The UK wasn’t the first to see the utility of this sort of thing either. In Australia, 4RAR (a regular infantry battalion) converted to a commando unit in 1997 that, in Australian practice, became a parachute and raiding watercraft borne unit. They supported the Australian SAS regiment in Iraq and Afghanistan. A specialist engineering unit and helicopter unit was also raised to support the entire special forces group (that already had its own signals outfit). I imagine the UK was well apprised of these developments – a lot of which was happening roughly around the same time as Sierra Leone, especially post-9/11. So, not to steal anyone’s thunder, but maybe there was some inspiration from us colonial hicks as well.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-88507393714309773732013-07-15T23:51:17.741+01:002013-07-15T23:51:17.741+01:00Welcome with open arms to the home of the techno m...Welcome with open arms to the home of the techno mong! It's a miracle when I can change the bloody background picture.<br /><br />I think part of the debate would be; what would you do with 1 PARA if they weren't the bulk component of the SFSG? There would be an argument for example that in future you could deploy two of the para battalions to an enduring op, bolstered by ad hoc assignments of other units, and leave one of the Paras at home as the lead airborne task force. But how often would we need that versus the need for a good quality SFSG?<br /><br />Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-91190990691406297482013-07-15T21:59:08.201+01:002013-07-15T21:59:08.201+01:00Yes it's me can't get this thing to work w...Yes it's me can't get this thing to work with a sign in. I'm being a techno mong. <br /><br />I think one thing is certain - the mission is there. Somebody has got to do it. I have a hunch that SFSG is the type of unit needed as its a joint unit with air sea and land expertise and which has focus and can train closely with the SF units. I think ad-hoc taskings is not "as good" but can still get the job done. I think SF employment is going to increase as a relative percentage of Army activities so I think we can afford the specialisation. If the SFSG has a detrimental impact on the wider Army's capabilities in any real tangible sense I'd reconsider my opinion.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-54576814079304953032013-07-15T20:12:54.643+01:002013-07-15T20:12:54.643+01:00Evening Anon (I'm guessing Phil),
I remember ...Evening Anon (I'm guessing Phil),<br /><br />I remember hearing somewhere that the SFSG planning started a lot earlier, in response to the advantages that were demonstrated in 'that raid' in Sierra Leone. <br /><br />Just wondering if we're talking about an ongoing operation whether you could work a spare company into the prep as the support group? Outside of an enduring operation, how much requirement is there for a support unit? Granted you have the funding angle and the cooperation that's built up over time, but how much use that has to the ordinary running of things is the open question. Obviously we're very much feeling in the dark on this one.Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-65164004893857138212013-07-15T19:47:56.051+01:002013-07-15T19:47:56.051+01:00The thing with SFSG is, it wasn't shat out in ...The thing with SFSG is, it wasn't shat out in the middle of peace. It was raised in 2006 when the SAS/SBS were busy and were using units on an ad-hoc basis to do what SFSG do now. So without knowing for certain I would say that perhaps the group was born out of necessity and was a solution to a real problem and not a solution looking for a problem. They're far more akin to the US Army Rangers and I can see the argument for having a dedicated support unit so that training relationships can be built up and they can be more plushly equipped than a rotating line unit. Also, it builds confidence which means they are more likely to be used at the edge of their capability which perhaps makes them the more efficient and potent option. Sierra Leone would probably have been the perfect mission for it. As has the Afghan campaign where the unit has beefed up SF units and made them go farther and given them some mass which you need when training and mentoring and operating in partnership.<br /><br />As for reserve SAS - well. Quite the current affair. Personally I think too much is expected for too little training time. I think the reserves could be cut to a detachment and only take exceptional men with backgrounds of extreme fitness and could take selection in their stride.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-11023573822907640912013-07-14T22:29:43.832+01:002013-07-14T22:29:43.832+01:00Bonjour Phil,
Aye. Funding is indeed the key word...Bonjour Phil,<br /><br />Aye. Funding is indeed the key word. With enough money you could run the entire non-armoured branch of the infantry through a cycle of six months gruelling PT prep, six months intensive FIBUA including all the hostage rescue business, six months doing sneaky recce work etc, and so on. The cost however would be tremendous and likely unbearable.<br /><br />I think perhaps there is a balance to be struck between the positions. On the one hand, you have your expensive SF core (SAS/SBS) for a lot of the sneaky work and a lot of COIN work. On the other the SFSG might not be quite as neccessary, and it is questionable whether certain tasks like the Pebble Island raid were really the best use of the SF. <br /><br />On the TA SAS, or whatever they're called now (SAS Reserve?) I think the argument rests on them being given a single job and trained specifically for that. The question is what? In the cold war that was the rather dubious plan to muster them at short notice and use them as stay behind parties. Given that the Fulda Gap is a lot safer these days, quite what the reserves are geared for now is a bit of a mystery (which is perhaps for the best).Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-46444016070306485882013-07-14T14:28:10.377+01:002013-07-14T14:28:10.377+01:00The key to Special Forces is that they have to rem...The key to Special Forces is that they have to remain "special". <br /><br />A small group of well funded (and funded is the key word) and well trained men when properly applied are going to be very useful indeed. They'll have the kit and above all will probably have had the time to focus on training on it or else being on operations with it. <br /><br />That's something a line infantry battalion can't achieve on an on-going basis as it has other commitments; and it's one of many battalions and so funding is more of an issue. So it's not a case of whether or not a line battalion can be bought up to Commando standard (if there is such a thing) - it can with the time, the money and the will - it's more of a case of accepting that on an on-going basis they can't and so you need some special forces.<br /><br />But the slope is slippery and having a special forces pool to big will mean concentrating good blokes and good leaders in it at the expense of the wider force. <br /><br />I honestly think we get it about right bar the existence of the reserve SAS units which I find a bit pointless to be honest. There is also perhaps scope to merge the SAS and SBS into one SF unit but one wonders if that would bring that much efficiency as SF is a very close knit group anyway working under a joint culture. <br /><br />The Phil from TD.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-76475205654540414002013-07-08T21:46:30.270+01:002013-07-08T21:46:30.270+01:00Two things I would say.
One is the discrete natur...Two things I would say.<br /><br />One is the discrete nature of it. We're not going to comment on it, nor will the other party. It may not be that we're ashamed or anything like, but it might prove somewhat difficult to explain to other allies. Doing it on the quiet has its advantages.<br /><br />Secondly, there is a range of skills that would need to be taught. Having a small unit of men who can cover everything from tactics and firearms handling to communications, to medicine, etc, as well as being able to speak with authority on a wide array of subjects from their previous regimental jobs, and being able to train anyone from the line infantry all the way up to the countries special forces and royal bodyguards (or equivalent), all to a very high level, would potentially save money vs having to deploy a larger group that covers a wide array of specialities. Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-21149160098791023922013-07-08T21:37:44.020+01:002013-07-08T21:37:44.020+01:00Normally that would go the other way, at least tha...Normally that would go the other way, at least that's what I've seen elsewhere. <br /><br />Not least because I've yet to see a coherent case, even just one line of an argument, as to why getting rid of the RAF would achieve any kind of benefit.Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-65138604217164166782013-07-08T16:29:59.907+01:002013-07-08T16:29:59.907+01:00"Then there are subjects that get people hot ..."Then there are subjects that get people hot under the collar and produce reams of comments."<br /><br />I am looking forward to the day you do an article on why the RAF should be abolished as a separate service. My guess is that it will fall into the "read and file under common sense" category and attract very few, if any, comments.<br /><br />HurstLlamahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01086351645473769872noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-85913799628137743202013-07-08T16:22:37.518+01:002013-07-08T16:22:37.518+01:00Interesting you mentioned training of foreign pote...Interesting you mentioned training of foreign potentates troops. In the late 1990s I was working in the Middle East and and my job brought me into contact with the OC of such a training mission. He was barking mad and probably clinically insane, but leave that on one side. He did say that there was nothing his chaps were training that could not be equally well trained by regular infantry or, for the close protection stuff, by the RMP. However, the local potentate insisted on his hooligans because of their reputation.<br /><br />I suspect that if the UK had proposed a training mission from, say, the Fusiliers and the RMP, we would have been rebuffed and the contract (along with the dosh and diplomatic influence) would have gone to the Sceptics and their special forces. So maybe there is a hidden benefit to maintaining our own special forces and there effect is not always to be seen on the battlefield.<br /><br />P.S. Still think we could seriously cut the numbers though. HurstLlamahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01086351645473769872noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-55604453384825524882013-07-08T12:47:34.138+01:002013-07-08T12:47:34.138+01:00Afternoon Gareth,
Won't get a chance to read ...Afternoon Gareth,<br /><br />Won't get a chance to read that piece till later, but would certainly agree with the broad premise that there are roles that could be passed to other units to deal with, leaving some of the more sneaky beaky stuff to "them".<br /><br />One of the consistent problems identified with special forces, which has been going on practically ever since they were created, is their misuse. This is why that SAS Commander who was reportedly going into the field with some of his men (in Afghanistan I think?) caught so much flak, because he's supposed to be in a HQ somewhere trying to convince people that company sized attacks are not the best use of his manpower resources.<br /><br />This problem became especially acute in WW2 during the Normandy invasion, where units were being plopped 20-30 miles behind enemy lines, right into the heart of zee German positions, against targets of limited worth. GW1 is another example. There was seemingly no job for them to do, so rather than just not use them at all, they were put to use scud hunting. <br />Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-44010870280863845632013-07-08T12:32:39.872+01:002013-07-08T12:32:39.872+01:00Pageviews have increased over the last few days, s...Pageviews have increased over the last few days, so it's certainly not for a lack of readers.<br /><br />If you look at the comments on other places, like Think Defence, there are certain subjects where people just read and are content with that. Then there are subjects that get people hot under the collar and produce reams of comments. Compare some of TD's articles comment count to the comment count on any post about aircraft carriers. I did a post here, the "we are an island you know...", which generated a high of 43 comments for example.<br /><br />Which is why, as much as people complain, newspapers will never stop printing sensational journalism. Because it simply has proven to be a highly consistent seller.<br />Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-87731012539930005552013-07-08T12:21:57.050+01:002013-07-08T12:21:57.050+01:00Afternoon,
With regards to the Royal Marines and ...Afternoon,<br /><br />With regards to the Royal Marines and beach recce (and sticking with the advocates position for a minute), they could always maintain a unit similar to the PARA's pathfinder platoon, as in a platoon designed and trained exclusively for the reconnaissance of the beach approach, tides, sands, and a bit of inland recce if needed.<br /><br />Switching to my personal opinion, the use of Special Forces has always found its greatest home in unconventional tasks. As mentioned in the article, the US need for modern special forces was driven almost exclusively by events in Vietnam, similar to how ours were ressurected to fight in places like Malaya and Oman.<br /><br />That's the real benefit of groups like the SAS and SBS, especially going forward. To be sent to places that the government would rather people not know that help was being sent, and/or to operate "in the sticks" as it were in theatres like Afghanistan, away from the FOB's. Training and leading people we don't neccessarily want others to know we're training, and causing a bit of havoc away from the main areas of operations.<br /><br />The fact that such units, in our forces and the Americans, are trained and organised to be highly independent down to what is essentially the fire team level tells you everything that you need to know about them.<br /><br /><br /><br />Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18182426936194426623noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-23840803600502947432013-07-08T08:02:16.981+01:002013-07-08T08:02:16.981+01:00very interesting piece. Reminds me of this article...very interesting piece. Reminds me of this article:<br /><br />http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/sof.html<br /><br />which argues for special forces but suggests more "speciality" forces and a lot of roles could be performed by suitably equipped and trained "regular" forces; obviously focused on US but wouldn't a more rational division of labour assist training, etc?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10940535661399125656noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-81680239147496491272013-07-07T17:54:09.167+01:002013-07-07T17:54:09.167+01:00Well, I liked the article, even if only one bugger...Well, I liked the article, even if only one bugger else commented!TrThttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07316335177828136131noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1835455773953043846.post-43686958836948836592013-07-06T14:13:15.669+01:002013-07-06T14:13:15.669+01:00In his book Defeat into Victory Viscount Slim said...In his book Defeat into Victory Viscount Slim said, "A well-trained infantry battalion should be able to do what a commando could do. In the XIV army they could and did". He held that wars were not won by special forces but by the standard of training of the average infantry unit. In fact he was quite scathing about special forces, "The rush to form special forces arose from confused thinking about what were, and were not, the normal operations of war". Slim was probably the best General the UK has produced since Wellington so I hesitate to contradict him.<br /><br />You may recall a situation a few years ago when some British soldiers were captured and held hostage by some armed thugs in West Africa. The MoD flew out Paras and SAS to effect the rescue (which they did but not flawlessly) leaving the infantry unit on the ground on the sidelines. I remember thinking at the time that if I had been the OC of that unit I would have resigned my commission on the spot - by bringing in the Paras to rescue my men the MoD were in effect saying that my regiment wasn't fit to fight, even a bunch of armed thugs. Since the Iranian Embassy rescue and the Falklands the MoD seem to have got into the mind-set that only the special forces, the paras and the RM could be trusted to fight. Iraq and Afghanistan have hopefully shown them the error of that thinking.<br /><br />However, there are, in warfare, tasks that need to be done, such as the beach recce mentioned by Mr. TrT above, that do require specialist training and aptitudes - the tasks themselves are outside the normal operations of war and it would be wasteful, indeed impossible, to train large numbers of people in the skills required to do them. Those needs might be met by having a cadre in each battalion/commando who have done the necessary course (topped up as required) as, I think, the RM did with the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre or as stand alone specialist forces. <br /><br />I suspect that keeping a specialist subset, the Hooligans of Hereford or those very nice gentlemen at Poole, will produce a better effect when required but I don't know whether the degree of that extra effect is worth the cost. I further suspect that, post-Afghanistan, we could safely dial back the numbers of Special and Elite Forces and move to a more cadre based system of providing the expertise, without sacrificing national capability. HurstLlamahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01086351645473769872noreply@blogger.com